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When Guinea, the Gambia, and Senegal decided to involve the private sector in the provision of water
and sewerage services, they also established State Holding Companies (SHCs) which were 100 percent
State-owned entities with exclusive or partial responsibility for:  (i) owning infrastructure assets; (ii)
planning  and  financing  investments  (i.e.  main  asset  replacements  and  network  expansions); (iii)
regulating the activities of the private operator; and (iv) promoting public acceptance of the PPI reforms.
In C6te d'Ivoire, by contrast, private sector participation in the water sector was introduced in 1960 but a
SHC was never established. The objective of this paper is to review  the experiences of those four
countries to  determine whether or not SHCs appear to  promote the  success of private participation
schemes in the water sector.
The paper reviews the four types of functions performed by SHCs in Guinea, the Gambia, and Senegal,
and discusses, in light of the experiences of these three countries and of that of C6te d'Ivoire, whether,
and under what circumstances, SHCs might be the best suited entities to carry out such functions. The
conclusion is that the creation of a SHC will very often constitute a sub-optimal solution. Establishing a
SHC to  plan  and  finance  investments might  be justified,  but  only  under  a  set  of  very  specific
circumstances.  A  SHC  might  be  best  placed  to  plan  and  finance investments  when: investment
responsibility cannot be transferred to the private operator; tariffs are insufficient, at least for a time, to
cover investment needs, so that access by a public entity to other sources of finance is crucial; and the
financial strength and accountability of the SHC, or the SHC's  incentives and ability to promote the
gradual adoption of cost-covering tariffs, are superior to those of a ministerial departrnent. When one or
more of these conditions are not met, the main investment responsibilities should be transferred to the
private operator, and if that is not possible, left to the Government itself.  As to the other three functions,
they should, as a general rule, not be performed by a SHC.
1.  INTRODUCTION
1.  As international experience with respect to private participation  in infrastructure (PPI) developed,
it became clear that institutional issues often determine to a large extent the success or failure of PPI
arrangements. One such  issue,  which has  received comparatively little attention  so  far,  relates to
Special  Assistant  to the Vice-President,  Private  Sector  Development  and  Infrastructure,  World  Bank.  The author
gratefully  acknowledges  comments  made  by Jan  Janssens  and Neil  Roger  (Peer  Reviewers),  as well  as
exchanges  of views  with,  and  comments  by, Oliver  Campbell  White,  George  Clarke,  Timothy  Irwin,  Celine
Levesque,  Alain  Locussol,  Nemat  Shafik,  Claude  Sorel,  Warrick  Smith,  Clemencia  Torres,  and Richard
Verspyck  of the World  Bank.2
whether - and under what conditions - the creation of a State Holding Company (SHC) in the water sector
can positively or negatively affect the performance  of PPI arrangements in that sector.
2.  The term SHC can be used to refer to at least two rather distinct types of companies.  The first
type of SHCs are publicly owned companies which are set up to own and oversee the management of
several public enterprises, often in different sectors of activity.  Such SHCs rnight be established for a
variety of reasons.  Some of them are set up in the expectation that they will be able to manage the public
enterprises which they own in a more efficient way than would a ministry.  This was, for example, the
principal goal of the establishment of SHCs in Algeria in 1988.1  In other instances, the SHCs might be
established to  prepare the  enterprises which  they  own  for  privatization and  to  then  transfer  these
enterprises to the private sector.  This was the case of the Treuhandanstalt  in Germany which was set up
in 1990 to transfer hundreds of ex East German public enterprises  to the private sector, and which ceased
its activities, as planned, in December 1994 when its task was substantially completed. 2 A body of
literature is devoted to the different variants of this first type of SHCs, which are not the focus of the
present paper.3
3.  SHCs of the second type, which are those with which we will be concerned here, are set up when
private  operations are  introduced in  a  particular infrastructure sector.  Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is
probably the region which has accumulated  the widest experience  with the use of SHCs alongside private
operations in the water sector. In Guinea, Gambia, Senegal, and C6te d'Ivoire private sector participation
was introduced by concluding leases - sometimes with elements of concession contracts - with private
operators.  Such  contracts  transferred  some  responsibilities  to  private  operators  but  left  some
responsibilities  to public authorities as well (for a brief description of the main types of PPI arrangements,
see Box 1, below).  The private operators were entrusted primarily with the tasks of: (i) operating and
maintaining the water distribution systems; (ii) collecting revenues from the users (and sharing these
revenues with public entities - see Box 1, below), and, in some cases; (iii) carrying out some investments
(i.e. some asset replacements and  network expansions).  Public authorities, for  their part,  remained
responsible for: (i) designing sector policies and strategies; (ii) owning infrastructure assets; (iii) planning
and financing some or all investments; (iv) regulating the activities of the private operator; and  (v)
promoting public acceptance of the PPI reforms. In COte  d'Ivoire those five functions were performed, to
a large extent, by the line ministry.  In Guinea, Gambia, and Senegal, on the other hand, while the line
ministry  remained  in  charge  of  designing  sector  policies,  SHCs  were  entrusted  with  important
responsibilities with respect to the other four functions.  In those three countries, the SHC was a  100
percent State-owned entity, staffed largely with some of the personnel of the public utility which used to
be in charge of providing the service prior to the introduction of private participation in the sector.
Another part of the staff of the old public utility - the vast majority in fact - joined the new company set
up by the private operator.
4.  The objective of this paper is to discuss the pros  and cons of setting up  SHCs of the type
described in paragraph 3. The next section of the paper briefly discusses the factors which prompted the
governments of Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Gambia, and Senegal to seek private sector participation in the
water sector and reviews the main features of the institutional and contractual arrangements put in place
in those four countries. The following section reviews, in turn, each of the four functions entrusted to a
SHC in Guinea, Gambia, and Senegal and draws on the experiences of those three countries as well as on
that of Cote d'Ivoire to try to determine whether a SHC does indeed appear best suited to carry out such
' See  Kumar  (1992),  at 12.
2 See  Guislain  (1997),  at 160-162.
'See, for  example,  Kumar  (1992)  and Kumar  (1993).3
functions or whether other public or private entities might in fact be better equipped. While the discussion
focuses on  the water sector in the four African countries mentioned above, many of the arguments
presented here would be applicable to other developing countries and to other infrastructure sectors as
well. It is important  to emphasize, however, that the impact of setting up a SHC on the performance  of a
particular PPI arrangement will depend, in each particular case, upon the specific features of the proposed
SHC and upon a wide variety of cultural, economic, legal and institutional factors which cannot all be
discussed in a paper such as this one. The objective here is to identify the factors which are likely to be
relevant in most contexts when deciding whether to set up a SHC and what functions to give to it. One
should however keep in mind that each situation will require a specific analysis and that the conclusions
presented here might have to be amended in the face of some particular circumstances.4
Box 1: The Various Types of PPI Options
There is a continuum of options for involving the private sector in the provision
of infrastructure  services. Those options differ according to the extent of the
rights and obligations  transferred to the private operator.
First, there are subcontracting  arrangements whereby the private party is not  RANGE OF PRIVATE
directly responsible  for providing public services but instead  performs specific  SECTOR OPTIONS
tasks, such as supplying inputs, constructing works, maintaining assets, or
billing customers, usually in exchange  for a  fixedfee.
Management contracts typically require the private party to manage a utility  Private
and provide services to the public  for a given period of time. The remuneration
of the private operator might be fixed at the outset, in which case the
commercial risks of the operation are borne entirely by the public sector, or it
might be linked to the performance of the utility, in which case the private  Divestiture
operator  might bear some commercial risks.
Under leasing arrangements,  the private operator  is responsible  for  providing
the service at its own risk, including operating and maintaining the  BOOs
infrastructure,  for a given period of time. The operator is, however, not
responsible  forfinancing  investments such as replacements  of major assets or
expansions  of the network. If payments  from the users cover more than the
operator's remuneration,  the operator is normally supposed to return the  BOTs
difference to the public authorities in order to cover the cost of the investments  Concessions
for which public authorities remain responsible.
Concessions  are similar to leases except that the private operator is responsible
for asset replacements  and network expansions as well. The term BOT (build-  Leasing
operate-transfer)  is often used to refer to greenfield concessions.  At the end of a
concession, or BOT, assets are returned to the public sector.
BOOs (build-own-operate)  are similar to BOTs except that the scheme does not  Mgmt.  Contracts
involve transfer of the assets to the public sector after a pre-determined  period
of time. The  private operator thus remains responsible  for carrying out all
investments required  to meet its service obligations.  _  _
Finally, divestitures involve the transfer to the private operator of the ownership  Subcontracting
of existing assets and the responsibility  for future upkeep and expansion.
Public
Source: Guislain and Kerf (1996).5
2.  CHOICE  OF PPI OPTION  IN COTE  D'IVOIRE,  GUINEA,  GAMBIA,  AND  SENEGAL
2.1. Cte  d'Ivoire
5.  The origins  of the PPI option  currently  in place in the C6te d'Ivoire  water  sector  go back  a very
long  way. As early  as 1959,  before  independence,  an international  tender  was  launched  to select  a private
operator  which  would  be responsible  for the provision  of municipal  water  services  in Abidjan. Until  that
time,  water  supply  services  had traditionally  been  the responsibility  of the municipalities,  which  tended  to
lack both the technical  and the financial  resources  to operate  the systems  efficiently  and to expand  the
networks.  The  French  company,  SAUR,  won  the  tender  and subsequently  a new company,  the Societe  de
Distribution  d'Eau de Cote d'Ivoire (SODECI),  was formed  with SAUR  as the main shareholder. In
1974,  responsibility  for sector management  was transferred  to the central government  and SODECI's
contract  was modified. President  Houphouet-Boigny  had apparently  been impressed  by the relative
efficiency  of SODECI  - especially  when  compared  with  the performance  of EECI  (Energie  Electrique  de
C6te  d'Ivoire),  the public  utility  which  was  by then  running  many  of the water  systems  outside  of Abidjan
on behalf of the municipalities 4 - and SODECI's  contract  was expanded  to include responsibility  for
operation  and maintenance  not only in Abidjan,  but in all other Ivoirian cities as well.  The Water
Directorate  of the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation,  currently  re-designated  Ministry of
Economic  Infrastructure,  became  the owner  of sector  assets,  and assumed  responsibility  for planning  and
investment  as well  as for monitoring  SODECI's  activities. Sector  finances  were  however  managed  by an
autonomous  agency, the Fonds National de l'Hydraulique (FNH), which could borrow to finance
investment  and which also received  the difference  between  the tariff that SODECI  collected  from the
users  and the  lease  fees that  SODECI  retained. 5
6.  In the late 1970's, Cote d'Ivoite was hit by a series  of macroeconomic  shocks  from which the
economy  did not start to recover until the devaluation  of the CFA Franc in 1994. While SODECI's
operational  performance  remained  very good  - with  high water  quality,  high collection  rate from private
users  (although  not from public  users),  high labor  productivity  (about  8 workers  per 1000  connections  in
1987),  and low levels of unaccounted  for water  or UFW (about 15 percent  in 1987,  similar to figures
observed  in Western  Europe)  - a serious  financial  crisis developed  in the sector  in the 1980's. This was
due, for the main part,  to the fact that the Water Directorate,  which  did not have to consult  SODECI  on
the planning  of the investment  program  and was not responsible  for ensuring  that sufficient  financial
resources  existed  to implement  that program,  designed  overly  ambitious  projects  in the 1980's and failed
to anticipate  the extent  to which demand  would  be affected  by the crisis. Increases  in the water tariff,
implemented  in 1981 and 1984, also depressed  large users' demand. As large industrial  users,  which
were paying  the highest  rates, sharply  reduced  their water consumption,  the resources  which SODECI
transferred  to the FNH dwindled. By 1985 no investment  could be made in the network and the
connection  rate,  which had been  about  80 percent  in 1980  progressively  fell to just above  70 percent  in
1987  (see  Box  2 below).
4 See  Menard  and  Clarke  (2000b),  at 5.
5 Between  1975  and  1987,  80  percent  of investment  was  funded  through  borrowing  from  bilateral  and  multilateral
agencies,  as  well  as  from  commercial  banks.  See  M6nard  and  Clarke  (2000b),  at 21.6
Box 2: The 1980s Financing Crisis in the Cote dI'voire Water Sector
After independence, Cote d'Ivoire enjoyed almost 20 years of sustained economic growth (GDP growth
averaged almost 8 percent per year between 1961 and 1979). In the late 1970's, however, the prices of
cocoa and coffee substantially dropped. As those two commodities represented over 60 percent of Cote
d'Ivoire merchandise exports in 1979, growth radically slowed and the public sector deficit ballooned. To
reverse this trend, the Government reduced public investment,  froze  wages, and significantly increased
the prices of utility services. Water tariffs, which had been set at US$0.40 per cubic meter in 1974 were
raised in 1981, to reach an average of US$0.71, and again in 1984, when water tariffs for  industrial
users more than doubled.
As a result, industrial and commercial users started to reduce waste, recycle water, and rely upon their
own wells. Demand by large water users  fell by 30 percent between 1980 and 1985. At the same time, the
number of connections continued to grow but those were mostly social connections  for poor users who
consumed little water.  Overall, water demand remained about constant.  Total water revenues did
substantially decrease, however, as the price paid by small users was far  lower than the price paid by
commercial  and industrial users. As SODECI's remuneration was about the same  for all tariff levels, the
part of  the consumer tariff which could be allocated to  cover debt  service and  investment - which
SODECI was supposed to transfer to the Fonds National de l'Hydraulique (FNH) - was substantially
reduced.
In addition, the  Water Directorate which assumed  responsibility for  investment planning failed  to
anticipate the stagnation of water demand, and this in turn had two adverse consequences on sector
finances.  First, the Water Directorate continued to plan expansions of productive capacity in Abidjan
and in the secondary centers, and by the mid-1980's, the utilization rate for  productive capacity had
become very low.  Second, as SODECI's remuneration was based upon projected, not actual revenues,
SODECI's  revenues were  based  upon  an  over-estimate of  water consumption and  were  therefore
protected at the expense of the revenues allocated to the FNH. As a result, no transfer of resources  from
SODECI to the FNH took place in the mid-1980's and no investment took place in the water sector in
1985 and 1986.
Source:  M6nard and Clarke (2000b).
7.  In 1987, the Government started to implement a restructuring program in an attempt to alleviate
the water sector crisis and take into account some of the lessons learned during the previous years.
Instead of  splitting responsibility for planning and  for financing investments between two  different
entities (the Water Directorate and the FNH), it was decided to transfer the planning function to SODECI
and  to  try  to  ensure  that  investment would  be  self-financed.  Initial  negotiations  focussed  on
implementing a full concession contract under which SODECI would have assumed full responsibility for
investment and debt service.  The overall economic environment was, however, unfavorable; it was not
clear that sector revenues would be sufficient to cover debt service requirements; and SODECI indicated
that it was not prepared to assume all  investment and debt service risks.  While the new contractual
arrangement gives to SODECI planning responsibilities and therefore a large degree of control over
investment,6 it  however  remains a  lease  because SODECI  does not  commit its  own  resources to
implement the investment program and to cover debt service charges, and it does not, therefore, bear any
investment-related risks.  Financial resources for  investment and  debt  service are  supposed to  be
6 Despite contractual provisions which gave to SODECI responsibility for planning and executing investment, a
public agency remained in charge of those functions during the first eight years of contract implementation.
See paragraphs 32-33, below.7
generated  only  by the difference  between  consumer  tariffs  and SODECI'  s lease  fees. Such  resources  are
channeled  to the Fonds  de Developpement  de l'Eau (FDE)  which  funds  investment  expenditures  and to
the Fonds  National de l 'Eau (FNE) which funds debt service.
8.  Prior to 1987, SODECI  had been obliged  to operate and maintain  any additions  made to the
existing  system  but was guaranteed  compensation  if the amount  of water actually  consumed  fell below
some  forecasted  levels calculated  so as to take into account  any extensions  of the network. As SODECI
became  responsible  for investment  planning,  that guarantee  was eliminated.  In addition  to the guarantee,
SODECI  had also benefited  from  relatively  high lease fees. By suggesting  that they might allow  other
companies  to bid for the contract,  the authorities  managed  to negotiate  a 20 percent  reduction  of those
fees with the private  operator. The Water  Directorate,  for its part, remained  responsible  for monitoring
SODECI's  contract  and for supervising  new  investments.
2.2. Guinea
9.  In Guinea,  water sector reforms were introduced  in  1988-1989. While in C6te d'Ivoire, a
financial  crisis revealed  the need for reform  even though operational  performance  had remained  very
good, in the Guinean  water sector,  both the financial  situation  and the operational  performance  were
catastrophic  prior to the reforms. A public agency,  the Entreprise  Nationale  de Distribution  de l'Eau
Guin6enne  (DEG),  was responsible  for operation,  maintenance,  and investment  in Conakry  and other
urban areas. DEG was supposed  to be an autonomous  agency  with a board comprising  representatives
from  several  ministries.  In practice,  its board  never  met and  it was  treated  as a department  of the Ministry
of Natural  Resources  and Environment  (MNRE).  Like  the rest of the Guinean  civil service  in the 1980's,
it  was under-funded,  over-staffed,  and grossly inefficient (with more than 40  workers per  1000
connections  in 1987). Water tariffs were well below long run incremental  costs and public resources
were insufficient  to maintain  and expand  the system. In addition,  collection  rates were extremely  low
(few  private  users  were  billed  and it was  estimated,  in 1987,  that  only about  15  percent  of those who  were
billed actually  paid  for the water  they consumed). 7 As a result,  the water  network  was in very poor  shape
(with UFW  at levels above 50 percent),  water  quality was low, and the connection  rate was below 40
percent  in spite  of the presence  of abundant  fresh  water,  only 60 km away from  Conakry,  which  could  be
brought  to the capital  via a low cost gravity-fed  system. 8
10.  The military  regime  that came  to power  in 1984  recognized  that substantial  reforms  were  required
and the measures  finally  adopted  in the late 1980's  were  heavily  influenced  by recent  experience  in Cote
d'Ivoire. Prompted  by the poor state  of public  finances  and by donors' indications  that funds  would  not
be forthcorning  unless  steps were taken  to raise  tariffs,  the authorities  decided,  as in C8te d'lvoire, that
investment  in the water sector  should  be self-financing.  However,  as tariffs  had been set at very low
levels, it was decided that it would be politically  too difficult  to bring them to cost-covering  levels
immediately.  Instead,  financial  self-sufficiency  was  to be reached  over a period  of six years  during  which
govemment  funds  and proceeds  from  a World  Bank  loan would  be used  to subsidize  prices  on a declining
basis. Because  of the very poor track  record  of DEG,  the authorities  also became  convinced  that private
sector  involvement  was  necessary. But given  the dilapidated  state of the infrastructure,  the widespread
habit of not paying  for water  consumption,  the political  instability  which marked  the early  years of the
military regime, and  the absence of  credible safeguards against arbitrary interventions  by  the
Government,  transfer  of sector assets  to a private operator  could only have taken place at a very low
(perhaps  even at a negative)  price and this was politically  unacceptable. In addition,  the authorities
considered  that no private operator  would  be willing  to assume  investment  and debt service  risk in the
7 See  World  Bank  (1989).
8 For  a detailed  description  of the  Guinean  water  sector  prior  to the  reforms,  see  Menard  and  Clarke  (2000a).8
Guinean environment. For those reasons, as in C6te d'Ivoire, it was decided to involve a private operator
in the sector through a lease rather than through a concession contract.  The Societe d'Exploitation des
Eaux de Guin6e (SEEG), a joint-venture between SAUR and Compagnie G6ndrale  des Eaux, was selected
through competitive bidding in 1989 and assumed responsibility for operation and maintenance, as well
as for renewal of small pipes (less than 160mm  in diameter).
11.  The Guinean authorities attempted to design an institutional framework which, unlike the one in
place before 1987 in C6te d'Ivoire, would ensure that responsibility to plan and to finance investments
was vested in the same entity, and that the private operator's remuneration was kept under strict control.
The option which was chosen was to set up a SHC, the Soci6te Nationale des Eaux de Guin6e (SONEG),
a 100 percent State-owned agency responsible, inter alia, for owning sector assets and for planning and
financing investments. SONEG is also in charge of monitoring SEEG's activities and of negotiating with
SEEG the percentage of collected revenues that the private operator can retain.  As the rest of those
revenues is to be transferred to SONEG, it was expected that SONEG would keep a close watch over the
level of SEEG's allowed remuneration. Political and social considerations  undoubtedly played a role as
well in the decision to set up a SHC and to transfer some sectoral responsibilities to that entity rather than
to allocate such responsibilities  to a ministerial department  such as the Water Directorate in Cote d'Ivoire.
For example, the creation of SONEG reduced, to some extent, DEG's employees opposition to the reform
as the prospect of finding a job within a specialized sector-specific entity such as SONEG was more
appealing to those DEG staff who feared that they would not be retained by the private operator than the
prospect of being transferred  to a department  of the MNRE.
2.3.  Gambia
12.  In Gambia, sector reforms aimed at  introducing private participation in  water supply  were
implemented in  1993, after earlier reform efforts aimed at improving the performance of the public
operator proved insufficient.  The Gambia Utility Corporation (GUC) - a public entity - was established
in  1972 to provide water supply and electricity distribution services to the capital Banjul and to the
provincial cities. Sector performance was extremely poor for a variety of reasons: tariffs were set below
costs; governance was extremely weak, with a board made up exclusively of civil servants and constant
governmental intervention in the day to day running of the corporation; GUC was grossly over-staffed
with more than 1000 employees in charge of very small water and electricity systems (about 7,000 water
connections and 12,000 electricity connections in 1986), and GUC staff were extremely low-skilled with
illiteracy rates of 50 percent among supervisory staff and 90 percent among lower level staff. 9 As a
result, over the 1980's,  the water distribution system failed to meet increasing demand due to rapid
population growth and urbanization, the quality of the network deteriorated with UFW levels reaching at
least 40 percent, water quality was poor, and uncollected  bills increased to reach an estimated 40 percent
of receipts toward the end of the decade. 10
13.  To try to stem these problems, the Government concluded a performance contract with GUC in
1988 and changed the structure of GUC's board in 1990.  The new board imposed managerial changes
within GUC and greater efforts were made with respect to tariff collection (including imposition of some
service cuts in case of non-payment). Overall, results proved unsatisfactory, however, as GUC failed to
meet its performance obligations and the Government failed to honor its commitment to raise tariffs to
compensate for cost increases due, inter alia, to higher fuel taxes." 1 Finally, in 1992, the Government
9 See  World  Bank  (1986),  at 1-7.
'° See Republique  du Senegal,  Ministere  de l'Hydraulique  (1994),  Vol.  II, at 8.
"1  Id.9
decided  to implement  further  reforms  and to seek the participation  of a private  operator  in the water  and
electricity  sector. For reasons  similar  to those which  applied  in the Guinean  case  - i.e. poor state of the
assets,  poor collection  record, and political  uncertainty  - transfer  of assets to the private  sector would
have had to take place at a very low or even at a negative  price, and this was considered  politically
unacceptable. It  was clear also that no private operator would be  willing to  assume financial
responsibility  for investment  and debt service. The contractual  option  chosen  was therefore  a lease and
Management  Service  Gambia  (MGS),  a company  owned  mainly  by the French enterprise  SOGEA,  was
selected  as the lessee  through competitive  bidding. It started  operations  in July 1993 and was given
responsibility  for operation  and maintenance,  for renewal  of small pipes, and for formulating  proposals
for new  investments.
14.  As in Guinea,  the Government  decided  to set up a 100 percent  State-owned  SHC. The Utilities
Holding  Corporation  (UHC) was to receive  the - relatively  small difference  - between  user tariffs and
MSG's remuneration, 12 and take responsibility,  inter alia, for owning sector assets, for taking final
decisions  with  respect  to the planning  and financing  of renewals  and new  investments,  and for monitoring
the activities  of MSG. The reasons  why the authorities  decided  to set up such a SHC were similar  to
those which prevailed  in the Guinean  case: the belief that a SHC would be better equipped  than a
ministerial  department  to perform  these  functions,  and a desire  to assuage  the sector  employees'  concerns
about  reform  by giving  to some  of them  the prospect  of employment  within  a specialized  public  body.
2.4. Senegal
15.  In Senegal,  as in Gambia,  the decision  to introduce  private  sector  participation  in the water  sector
in the 1990's was taken after earlier reform  efforts failed to deliver sufficient improvements. The
provision  of urban water services,  which was a private business at the time of independence,  was
nationalized  in  1972 and directly controlled  by the Government. During the 1970's, substantial
investments  were implemented  in the sector  but service  quality remained  low because  of poor planning
and excessive  sophistication  of some  installations  which,  subsequently,  could  not be maintained  properly.
In an effort  to reduce  the direct influence  of the central  Government  in the management  of the sector,  it
was decided  to transfer  all assets  and related  debt service  obligations  to a public enterprise,  the Societe
Nationale d'Exploitation des Eaux du S6negal (SONEES).  SONEES concluded a contrat-plan with the
Government  in 1988,  which  was  modified  in 1990  to take account  of the experience  of the first two  years.
Under  the  terms  of the  contract,  SONEES  was  granted  primary  responsibility  for operation,  maintenance,
and rehabilitation  in the urban water supply  sector,  while the Government  undertook  to review  tariffs
twice a year in line with a pre-determined  pricing formula,  and to ensure that central  and municipal
authorities  would  pay their water bills. The Government  did not live up to its part of the agreement,
however:  it did not increase  tariffs  according  to the pricing formula;  it failed to curb non-payment  by
public  authorities;  and it maintained  control  over  most  investment  decisions.  As a result,  while  SONEES'
operational  performance  was broadly  satisfactory,  and while  labor productivity  was high (with about  7
employees  per 1000  connections  in 1994),  revenues  were insufficient  to cover  costs and this had severe
negative  consequences  on the state of the network. UFW  was about 30 percent in 1994,  water  quality
was unequal,  and while about 80 percent of the population  in Dakar  had access  to safe drinking  water,
this was  not the  case  for a substantial,  and growing,  number  of poor residents.' 3
12 Consumer  tariffs  varied  between  different  types  of  consumers  and  the  consumer  tariffs  for  agriculture  and  for
domestic  use  below  20  cubic  meter  were  in fact  inferior  to the  level  of the  lessee's  remuneration.  Therefore,
when  it sold  water  to those  two  types  of  consumers,  the  lessee  transferred  nothing  to the  SHC  and,  on  the
contrary,  retained  some  of the  receipts  which  would  otherwise  have  been  transferred  to the  SHC  to bring  its
remuneration  to the  agreed  level.  Id.,  at 14.
13 See  World  Bank  (1995a)  and  Janssens  (1999).10
16.  In  the  mid-1990's,  the  authorities  decided  to  implement  substantial  reforms,  including
introduction of private participation in the urban water sector.  As in Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea, financial
self-sufficiency  was seen as a key sectoral objective, and the authorities considered that a private operator
would be able to reap efficiency gains which would limit the extent of the tariff increases required to meet
that objective. The Government decided to raise tariffs gradually, and it was estimated that an increase of
2.4 percent per year from 1996 to 2003 would bring the sector to financial equilibrium (as opposed to 5
percent per year without private participation). 14 Private sector involvement was also seen as essential to
ensure real operational autonomy from the Government and to put greater pressure on public authorities
to reduce their water consumption and pay their water bills. As in the other countries, a transfer of assets
to the private sector was considered politically unacceptable and the overall environment was seen as
insufficiently attractive to convince private operators to assume full debt service and investment risks.
The type of private sector arrangement chosen in Senegal corresponds therefore broadly to a lease, but the
private operator is required to undertake some investments every year: the private operator has to renew
pipes over a pre-specified distance which varies depending upon the diameter of the pipes which the
private operator chooses to renew.  The Senegalaise des Eaux (SDE), a private company with SAUR as
the main shareholder, was selected as the lease contractor in  1996 through an international bidding
process.
17.  The Government also decided to set up a  100 percent State-owned SHC, the Societe Nationale
des Eaux du S6negal (SONES), which was to receive the difference before total consumer tariffs and
SDE's remuneration and which would be responsible, inter alia, for owning sector assets, planning and
financing investments (except for the renewals undertaken by SDE), and for monitoring the activities of
SDE.  As in Guinea and Gambia, the authorities considered that a SHC would perform these functions
with more efficiency than a central ministry, and that setting up a  SHC would help rally SONEES'
employees to the reform process. The relatively good perfortnance  of SONEES constituted an additional
reason, in Senegal, for maintaining a specialized public entity in the water sector.  Finally, those in favor
of establishing a SHC argued that SONES would be able to obtain a loan from commercial banks to cover
the temporary cash shortfall which would develop before the sector reached financial self-sufficiency in
2003, and that thanks to SONES the Government would thus not be required to take on additional debt.
3.  PERFORMANCE  OF SHCs
18.  In order to determine the potential usefulness of SHCs, the present section discusses the way in
which the SHCs established in Guinea, Gambia, and Senegal performed their functions as well as the way
in which those same functions were performed in C6te d'Ivoire. As mentioned above, those functions
relate to: (i) owning infrastructure assets; (ii) planning and financing asset replacements and network
expansions; (iii) regulating the activities of the private operator; and (iv) promoting acceptance of the PPI
arrangement.
14 See  World  Bank  (1995a),  at 34.11
3.1. Owning Infrastructure  Assets
19.  Owning infrastructure  assets involves the following types of tasks: acting as custodian of the
assets; maintaining an asset register; bringing and defending suits involving ownership interests  in the
assets; and determining dividend policy in compliance with the owners' bylaws and/or general legislation.
Ownership also implies the right to use the assets or to delegate that right.  As mentioned above, in all
four countries discussed here, the right to use the assets in order to provide water distribution services to
the public was delegated to a private operator. While SHCs were entrusted with ownership functions in
Guinea,  Gambia, and Senegal, such functions are performed  by the Ministry of Economic Infrastructure
in Cote d'Ivoire.
Public vs. Private Sector Options
20.  An important body of literature is devoted to the question of whether enterprises perform better
under public or private ownership. 15 Some authors have argued convincingly that when the State owns
enterprises, it tends to impose upon those enterprises a set of conflicting social and commercial objectives
which hampers the ability of those enterprises to function efficiently. In addition, they point out that
reforms designed to subject enterprises  to stiffer competition and to increase their commercial  focus while
maintaining those enterprises under public ownership have proven extremely difficult to sustain over the
long run. Such reforms can improve the performance of public enterprises for some time, but after a
while, government  intervention tends to increase again, and the performance  of public enterprises starts to
deteriorate.' 6 Consequently, there is today a growing consensus that, to the extent possible, enterprises
carrying out commercial functions should be privately-owned in  order to be  able to  focus on  their
commercial objectives and that social objectives should generally be pursued through means other than
the public ownership of commercial enterprises.  For governments in  the process of  designing PPI
schemes, this would a priori seem to constitute a powerful argument  in favor of transferring ownership of
utilities to private operators.
21.  In infrastructure sectors, however, public service provision is generally highly regulated. Such
regulations are usually imposed on the grounds that they are necessary to prevent the accumulation of
monopoly profits in activities which retain natural monopoly characteristics,  or that social considerations
or information failures prevent leaving the price  and quality of infrastructure services to unregulated
markets. Those two types of arguments are usually considered to be of particular relevance to water
distribution activities.  A discussion of whether those arguments do indeed justify regulating the sector is
beyond the scope of this paper.1 7 What matters here is that even when private sector participation is
introduced in water distribution, regulations - concerning tariffs, performance targets, exclusivity rights
etc. - are likely to remain prevalent for some time at least in the sector. In those conditions, the quality of
the regulatory regime might well affect the incentive framework and therefore the performance of the
operators more than the type of ownership.18
15 For a review  of that  literature,  see,  for example,  Kwoka  (1996).
16 See,  for example,  Kikeri,  Nellis  and  Shirley  (1994),  at 246-247.
7 For  an excellent  presentation  of the arguments  in favor  of deregulating  the provision  of water  services,  see Brook
and  Cowen  (1998).
"It  has  been  pointed  out,  for example,  that  the British  option  of transferring  ownership  of water  sector  assets  to  the
private  sector  and the French  option  of relying  on concessions  under  which  municipalities  retain  ownership  of
the assets,  might  in fact  bear  many  similarities  and  provide  very  much  the same  incentives  to the operators.
Indeed,  while  private  firms  own  the assets  in  Britain,  they  need  an operating  license  which  the Government
can revoke  after  25 years  with 10  years' notice.  And  while  private  firms  in France  do not  own the assets,12
22.  One has to recognize, in addition, that private firms might be unwilling to assume the legal
obligations associated with the ownership of water sector assets. This will often be the case, for example,
if the transfer of ownership entails the transfer of the liabilities of the public utility to the new private
investors.' 9 Finally, transferring to a private operator infrastructure assets considered by many as strategic
is often politically difficult, particularly when the commercial value of those assets is small as was the
case in Guinea, Gambia, and Senegal for example.
Public Sector Options
23.  When considered separately from the investment planning and financing functions discussed
below, the core ownership functions - which involve mainly book-keeping, dividend policy design, and
legal representation - are limited in scope and require competencies  of a legal and financial nature which
are not particularly sector-specific.  In those conditions, even when public ownership of the assets is the
preferred - or only feasible - option, it is hard to argue that a new sector-specific public entity is needed
to perform the key ownership functions.  In addition, SHCs are not necessarily better endowed with the
legal and financial expertise required than other public bodies: while some SHCs have proved able to
carry out ownership functions satisfactorily, others have failed to do so.  UHC, in Gambia, is a case in
point: a review of its performance carried out in  1995 revealed that records on water production were
missing or incomplete, tariff history was not readily available, sales figures were incoherent, and some
audit reports were missing. 20
24.  One could argue that in order to properly manage potential tensions between the State's interests
as an owner (such as maximizing the value of the assets, for example) and its interests as a policy maker
(such as ensuring the most efficient service provision possible), there might sometimes  be an advantage in
conferring ownership functions to a SHC rather than to the ministry already in charge of sector policy.
However, such a formal separation between the ownership and policy functions is likely to be illusory in
practice given the high degree of control which the authorities in charge of sector policy typically retain
over the  100 percent publicly-owned, sector-specific, SHC. In Guinea, political interference in  the
running of SONEG, the SHC, has been a constant problem as various ministries seek to impose their
priorities upon the company, either directly or through the board members which they designate. 2'  In
Gaambia,  the Government retained as much control over UHC, the SHC, as it held previously over the
public operator GUC: UHC was placed under the direct authority of the President's cabinet and it was the
cabinet, which, in practice, took all key decisions on both ownership and policy matters. 22 In Senegal,
SONES, the SHC, appears to be somewhat more independent, but its Director General has been directly
chosen  by the Ministry of Hydraulics. 23
municipalities  tend  in practice  to re-award  the concession  to the incumbent  when  the contract  expires.  See Kerf
et al. (1998).
19 For a discussion  of that  topic,  see  Guislain  (1997),  at 66-67.
20 See World  Bank  (1996),  at 7.
21 See  Republique  du Senegal,  Ministere  de l'Hydraulique  (1994),  Vol.  III, at 28.
22 Id.,  Vol. II, at 10.
23 In 2001,  however,  when  the successor  of the current  Director  General  is chosen,  SONES'  board  is supposed  to
propose  three  candidates  to the Minister  of Hydraulics  who  will  be obliged  to choose  one of those  candidates
as the Director  General.13
25.  In order to adequately manage tensions between ownership and  policy functions, ownership
functions need to be allocated to an entity which enjoys much more autonomy from government than a
sector-specific SHC of the type described here typically does. When infrastructure services in different
sectors are provided by private operators, a first possibility might be to transfer ownership responsibility
in these different sectors  to a cross-sector  SHC, on the assumption that a cross-sector  body might be better
able to maintain arms' length relationships with any single ministry, and therefore with the government  as
a whole, than a sector-specific  body. In most cases, such an arrangement is likely to be insufficient, on its
own, to ensure autonomy however. As mentioned above, while it is a sector-specific body, SONEG's
board is made up of representatives from various ministries and this has not prevented government's
interference in the  management of the company. A somewhat more promising scheme might be  to
allocate ownership and policy responsibilities to two separate ministries, for example the Ministry of
Finance on the one hand and the relevant sector ministry on the other. The success of the scheme would
however depend upon the degree of autonomy which exists in practice between the two ministries. In a
country like Gambia where all key decisions in the water sector were taken by the President's cabinet,
formally conferring different functions to different ministries would most likely have made little real
difference.
26.  A  scheme  which  might  deserve  some  consideration  consists  in  transferring  ownership
responsibilities to municipal authorities, while overall sector policy remains the purview of the central
government. Such a model has been widely adopted in France, for example: municipalities tend to retain
ownership of the assets and often delegate service provision to private operators, while sector policy is
designed mainly at the regional and central level. In Gdansk also, the city retains ownership of water
assets and a lease contract has been signed with a private operator, while sector policy is determined to a
large  extent  by  more  centralized  authorities. 24 This  model  might  ensure  some  separation  of
responsibilities where  municipal  governments are  elected locally  and  enjoy  some real  measure of
autonomy from the central government - a situation which might tend to become more frequent as a
growing number of countries are implementing decentralization  policies.
3.2.  Planning and Financing Asset Replacements  and Network Expansions
27.  As indicated in Box 1, above, PPI arrangements differ according to the amount of responsibilities
which they transfer to the private operator. Under the types of PPI arrangements implemented in Guinea,
Gambia, Senegal, and C8te d'Ivoire, the responsibility for planning and financing investments in the
water sector has  been  retained, at  least in  part,  by  the  public  sector.  As mentioned  above,  such
investments encompass at  least  some  asset replacements as  well  as  network  expansions, but not
maintenance  operations which are the responsibility of the private operator. Public sector responsibilities
might thus include: planning those investments;  contracting with and supervising the enterprises in charge
of undertaking the required civil works; and ensuring that appropriate sources of finance are available to
perform those works. As indicated above, in  Guinea, Gambia, and Senegal, SHCs were established
specifically to plan and to finance the public investment program in the water sector.  In C8te d'Ivoire
after 1987, on the other hand, ultimate responsibility for financing investments has been retained by the
Government (with tariffs supposedly set at levels sufficient to cover both investment and debt service
costs) while the private operator has assumed primary responsibility for planning the investments.
24 See Rivera  (1996),  at 15.14
Public  vs. Private  Sector Options
28.  There are powerful arguments in favor of transferring responsibilities not only for operation and
maintenance, but also for  investment planning and financing to  the private operator. First,  in many
countries, governments and public agencies in general have a rather poor track record with respect to the
planning and financing of water sector assets and they often lack the financial, and sometimes even the
technical, resources required to perform such functions in an adequate and timely manner. By contrast,
while private capacity to perform those functions might sometimes be lacking in the domestic market -
especially when water provision has been monopolized by public entities for a long time - such capacity
will often develop quickly when private operators gain access to the sector. In addition, some reputable
foreign private operators will have levels of technical and managerial know-how generally superior to
those of the public sector, and they will often have a greater credibility in the financial markets than
public water companies. Second, when private operators assume responsibility for investment financing,
they become an important constituency in favor of sustainable revenue-raising mechanisms ensuring that
all costs - i.e. operation and maintenance costs, as well as investment costs - are fully covered. Such
mechanisms, in turn, are a  key pre-condition to gain access to finance and to generate the financial
resources needed for increased service quality, and faster network expansion.  Consumer tariffs which
reflect the full cost of service will also tend to promote socially efficient levels of consumption. 25 Third,
transferring investment responsibility to the private operator prevents potentially serious coordination
problems. When, under a PPI arrangement, it is a public entity which takes decisions with respect to
investments without having direct operational responsibilities, there are risks that the investment program
might not optimally reflect operational needs. This risk is particularly important when the public entity, as
is often the case, is required to pursue non-commercial objectives. Private operators, on the other hand,
have  a  vested interest in  ensuring  that  investment decisions  are  responsive  to  operational needs,
profitable, and therefore quickly implemented.  Fourth, distinguishing clearly between investment and
maintenance is notoriously difficult, and when different parties are each responsible for one of those
tasks, they actually have incentives to disagree: the private party will often argue that an asset should be
replaced, i.e. that investments are needed (by the public party), while the public party will assert that the
asset should on the contrary be maintained  for some more time (by the private party). Finally, even if the
allocation of responsibilities can be  clarified, it might remain difficult to  determine who should be
accountable for  overall performance when responsibilities are  split,  since both  parties substantially
contribute to the overall quality of service provision.
29.  The experience of those countries where private operators were given no responsibilities - or
only minor responsibilities - with respect to investment planning and financing does indeed tend to
25 Barring  externalities,  charging  prices  equal  to marginal  costs  ensures  socially  optimal  levels  of consumption.  In
network activities such as water distribution, which present substantial economies of scales, cost-covering
tariffs  (i.e.  prices  set at average  costs  levels)  will  however  generally  be above  marginal  costs  and  therefore
above  socially  optimum  prices.  However,  even  when  they  are above  socially  optimum  prices,  cost-covering
tariffs  might  still  mark  progress  toward  such  socially  optimum  prices  in the many countries  where  water  used
to be considered as a free commodity  with an actual price close to zero. In addition, even in network
activities,  efficient price signals can still be sent to users under a cost-covering tariff regime if users are
requested to pay a set connection fee, as well as a consumption fee which covers the marginal  cost of
providing the service. Under a two-part tariff of that type, consumption  levels will still be close to socially
optimum levels provided that the connection fee is not so high as to induce users to cancel the service. When
users cannot afford the connection fee however, or when the provision of water distribution services is
associated with substantial positive externalities, public subsidy schemes might have to be considered. But
one has to recognize that this might make it impossible to transfer  investment responsibility to private
operators until the public authorities have demonstrated  the credibility and sustainability of such schemes.15
illustrate the problems mentioned in the preceding paragraph.  As already pointed out, such problems
were clearly present in Cote d'Ivoire  prior to 1987 (see Box 2, above).  Simnilar  problems also arose
during implementation  of the PPI arrangements  in Guinea, Gambia, and Senegal, and, to a certain extent,
after the 1987 reform in Cote d'lvoire  as well, as will be shown below.  On the other hand, there is
evidence that  such difficulties have been  avoided in  at  least some PPI  arrangements under  which
responsibilities not only for operation and maintenance, but also for investments, were transferred to the
private operator.  This appears to be largely the case, for example, in Argentina, where the authorities
decided to involve the private sector in the provision of water and sewerage services in Buenos Aires. A
thirty year concession contract was awarded in  1993, under  which the  concessionaire committed to
undertake all  investments necessary to meet specific performance targets relating inter alia to  water
pressure and  quality, percentage  of  population served,  and  network  renovation  schedule.  While
implementation  of the contract is not exempt of difficulties 26, the private operator has strong incentives to
lobby for tariffs which cover the full costs of service, it is able to coordinate its investment program to
meet operational needs, its responsibilities  are clear, and there is no doubt about who is accountable for
27 overall service  performance.
Public Sector Options
30.  While the benefits of  allocating responsibility for  operation and maintenance as well  as for
investment planning and financing to the private operator can be substantial, such arrangements remain,
however, relatively harder to negotiate in the water sector than in other infrastructure sectors.  Indeed,
unlike most other infrastructure assets, water sector assets are under ground. This tends to complicate the
task  of  assessing their exact physical  state and  therefore the  exact costs  of  meeting pre-specified
performance targets.  In such conditions, private operators might be reluctant, at least initially, to accept
full responsibility for investments even if prices appear to be set at cost-covering levels. A second-best
solution might then be to ensure that the difference between the tariffs collected from the users and the
operator's remuneration can be earmnarked  to cover the cost of investments, and to give a large role to the
private operator in the planning and execution  of those investments.
31.  Under such a scheme, the private operator does not commit to carry out all investments  required
to meet some pre-specified service standards, but only to carry out investments to the extent that funds
have been earmarked for that purpose. This might somewhat reduce the incentives of the private operator
to ensure that user tariffs do cover not only operation and maintenance, but investment costs as well. In
addition, to the extent that the funds to be used for investment purposes do not belong to the private
operator, there might also be a need for regulating the execution of investment work by the operator in
order to limit the scope for excess profits on this activity (this is a regulatory issue to which we return in
the  Section on  Regulating the  Activities of the  Private Operator, below). However, when properly
implemented, the scheme ensures that investments can be carried out without having to rely on public
sector intervention28  and it preserves a degree of coordination between investments on the one hand and
operation and maintenance  on the other.
26 See,  for example,  van den  Berg (2000).
27 On the Buenos  Aires  concession,  see Idelovitch  and Ringskog  (1995),  at 27-50.
28 The scheme  described  here  pre-supposes  that  the difference  between  the revenues  collected  from  users  and the
remuneration  of the private  operator  is sufficient  to cover  not only  the costs  of asset  replacements  but also  the
costs  of future  network  expansions.  Under  that  scenario,  there  is indeed  no need  for any  public  sector
intervention  to finance  investments  in the water  sector  and the investment  responsibilities  of the  private
operator  can be limited  to using  earmarked  funds  to carry  out the  required  investments.  If, on the other  hand,
user tariffs  were  sufficient  to cover  the costs  of asset  replacements  but not those  of network  expansions,
additional  involvement  would  be required  from  the public  sector  or from  the private  operator  (e.g.  to  borrow16
32.  As indicated in paragraph 7, above, the Government sought to implement a solution of this type
in COte  d'Ivoire in 1987.  The system has not worked exactly as planned, however.  Tariffs have been
increased more slowly than stipulated in the 1987 contract. In addition, the public sector, which accounts
for about 25 percent of total sector revenues, fails to pay its water bills and SODECI, which is unable to
cut off public sector entities for non-payment, has at times withheld payments to the FNE and FDE as a
compensation measure. As a result, the resources transferred to the two funds appear insufficient to fully
cover future investment and debt service needs. 29 Also, while SODECI was supposed to take the lead in
planning and executing investmrents,  a public agency - the Bureau National d'Etudes Techniques et de
D6veloppement (BNETD) - played the main role in  that respect from  1987  to  1995, and  tensions
developed between the BNETD, the Water Directorate of the Ministry of Economic Infrastructure, and
SODECI  regarding the ddsign of the investment program. 30
33.  In spite of these problems, overall sector performance since  1987 has been  very good: the
connection rate  in  Abidjan, which  had  been  declining during  most  of  the  1980's,  has  increased
substantially  since 1989 (see Figure 1, below); water quality has remained high; UFW is still a low 15%;
and labor productivity, which had been increasing before 1987, continued to improve afterwards - there
were about 3.8 employees per thousand connections  in 1996, a good figure by international standards (see
Figure 2, below). In addition, in 1995, BNETD's functions were reduced to those of technical consultant
to the Water Directorate, which monitors SODECI's activities.  As a  result, SODECI's  control over
investment planning and execution increased substantially and tensions between the three entities have
been reduced. 3'  In 1996, the Government also addressed the need for additional financial resources to
meet investment requirements by accepting to assume responsibility for repayment of a new loan by the
French bilateral aid agency - the  Caisse Franqaise de D6veloppement (CFD) - designed to  finance
investment programs, prepared by SODECI,  for new production units and additional social connections.
the sums  required  to perform  network  expansions  - sums  which  could  then be repayed  using  the revenues
collected  from the newly  connected  users). While  imposing  on existing  users  tariffs  which  cover  all
investment costs including network expansions thus minimizes  the  burden  imposed  on both  the public  sector
and the private operator, it means that existing users are asked to pay for the network expansions which will
benefit new users. Tariffs are therefore set above cost-covering levels, which might push them even further
above the socially optimal marginal cost levels, or result in unduly high connection fees (see footnote 25,
above).
29 See Menard and Clarke (2000b), at 35-36.
3 Id., at 25.
3  Id.17
Figure 1: Estimated Connection Rate in  Figure 2: Workers per Thousand Connections  in
Abidjan  Cote d'lvoire
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34.  Many French municipalities also rely on lease contracts with private operators to ensure water
distribution services, and with tariffs at about cost covering levels the private operators play a central role
in the planning and executing of investments. The examples of France and, to a certain extent, that of
C6te d'Ivoire  so far, thus tend to demonstrate that as long as required investments can be financed
exclusively, or at least mainly, through sector revenues, there should generally be no need for establishing
specialized public entities such as SHCs to assume responsibility  for investment planning and financing.
In Cote d'Ivoire,  however, if reliance  on  loans from International Financial  Institutions to  finance
investments were to become the rule rather than the exception in the future, the current model would in
fact re-introduce the split, which existed before 1987, between the entity in  charge of securing the
financing (i.e. the Government) and the entity in charge of planning investments (i.e. SODECI), therefore
potentially inducing SODECI to encourage  over-investment  or to invest inefficiently. 32
35.  In Guinea, Gambia, and Senegal, on the other hand, private operators were very reluctant, at least
initially, to assume major responsibility  with respect to investment planning and financing because of the
lack of credibility of the regulatory framework and/or the long transition period which would be required
to progressively raise water tariffs to cost-covering levels. In such circumstances, the authorities decided
to confer substantial investment responsibilities to the public sector. As mentioned above, the solution
adopted in all three countries was to set up SHCs responsible for investment planning and financing.
36.  The proponents of the SHC option argued that it would help to avoid the problems which arose in
Cote d'Ivoire before 1987 when responsibility for financing investments and for planning them were
conferred to different entities.  They considered, in addition, that a financially autonomous SHC, which
relies at least for part of its financing on revenues collected by the private operator, would have stronger
incentives than a ministerial department  to lobby the Government to ensure that tariffs were progressively
raised to cost-covering levels, thereby increasing the likelihood that appropriate investment levels would
be maintained in the long run.  Given the generally very poor managerial and financial performance of
public administrations, as well as their lack of financial accountability, some also argued that SHCs
would have easier access than ministerial departments to the commercial loans which might be necessary
if tariffs remained, for a time, insufficient to cover the remuneration of the private operator as well as
investment and debt service needs. Finally, an additional argument in favor of SHCs is that they might
constitute good vehicles for channeling donor funds, as some donors are reluctant to, or statutorily  barred
from, lending either to private operators or to non-commercial  entities such as ministries.
32 Id. at 28.18
37.  Performance  did in fact  improve  after implementation  of the reforms  in both Guinea  and Senegal.
In Guinea  which,  as indicted  above,  had one of the weakest  systems  prior to the reforms,  the connection
rate rose  from  about  38 percent  in 1989  to about  47 percent  in 1996,  and labor  productivity  rose sharply  at
the time of the reforms  as labor  retrenchment  reduced  the number  of workers  from above  40 to about  20
per 1,000  connections  (see Figure  3, below). Water quality  increased,  consumer  service  improved,  and
while  only about  5 percent  of users  had meters  in 1989,  98 percent  of private and 100 percent  of public
connections  were  metered  in 1996.33  Overall,  the welfare  effect  of the reforms  appears  to have  been  very
positive  for domestic  private  users,  thanks  in large  part  to the increased  connection  rate. 34
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Source:  Shirley  and  M6nard  (1999)
38.  In Senegal,  the fraction of the population  of Dakar with access to safe drinking  water has
increased  since  reforms  were implemented  from about  80 to 82 percent and UFW  has been reduced  by
about 4 percent, from 30 to 26 percent over the same period. 35 In addition, SONES did secure a
commercial  bank  loan to help  bridge  the gap in revenues  over  a transition  period  during  which  tariffs  are
being  progressively  raised  (see Box  3, below).
33 See  Menard  and  Clarke  (2000a),  at  29-30.
34 See  Clarke,  Menard,  and  Zuluaga  (2000),  at 34-35.
35 See  World  Bank  (2000a),  at  5-6.19
Box 3: Using the SHC to Bridge the Financing Gap in Senegal
In Senegal, an important investment program started to be implemented in 1996, as part of the reforms
associated with the conclusion of the PPI arrangement in the water sector. Because the program was
costly, because efficiency gains brought about by the investments and by private participation would only
materialize progressively, and because social and political considerations dictated that water tariffs,
which were low, could only be raised at a rate of 3% per year, the cumulative deficit in the sector
increased during the first  two years to peak  at about US$22 million in  1998.  It  is expected to be
progressively reduced to zero at the end of 2003.
To cover the transitional deficit, SONES, the SHC, raised a loan in May 1997  from  a syndicate of local
commercial banks. The banks agreed to provide a seven year loan to SONES. SONES, in turn, agreed
that the payments it would receive  from the private operator would be deposited in a special account out
of which the debt service payments would be made.
This operation was, however, difficult to arrange,  for three main reasons: (i) SONES lacked experience in
conducting such a transaction; (ii) banks were reluctant  to extend loans with medium-term maturities of 5
years or more in an  environment where macroeconomic risks were still perceived as  high; and (iii)
certain banks refused to extend loans to a State-owned enterprise unless the State agreed to pay  old
government debt which they still carried on their books.
Source: Sorel (1999).
39.  In Gambia, on  the other hand, experience with the lease contract concluded in July 1993 is
generally considered a failure.  While the connection rate increased and UFW levels were reduced during
implementation of the lease, this progress was due, not to the lease contract, but to implementation  by the
public authorities - with much delays - of a project prepared with various international donors during the
second half of the 1980's.  Relations between the SHC and MSG, the private operator, were tense from
the very beginning.  A severe lack of capacity within the SHC, both at the staff and at the managerial
level, and a high  degree of uncertainty regarding the precise scope  of maintenance and  investment
responsibilities contributed to these tensions.  The situation deteriorated further after the 1994 military
coup, and  when  MSG initiated  an aggressive campaign to  disconnect non-payers the  Government
unilaterally terminated the contract in February 1995.36
40.  Even in Guinea and Senegal where real progress took place, the lease agreements suffered from
some of the problems mentioned under paragraph 28 - such as relatively weak performance of public
entities, poor coordination between operational  and investment activities, disputes over the exact scope of
maintenance and investment responsibilities, and lack of accountability for overall performance - which
are common when operation and maintenance functions are entrusted to a private operator while a public
entity remains in charge of investment planning and financing. In addition, conferring responsibility for
investment planning and financing to a SHC often exacerbated some of those problems because the
arrangement  tended to breed resentment on the part of the SHC's employees. For a start, SHC employees
who used to run the water utility prior to private sector involvement, were generally reluctant to cede to
the  private  operator  responsibility  for  operating  the  utility,  maintaining  the  infrastructure,  and
implementing some investments, since this reduced the scope of public sector jobs, and therefore the
influence and non-salary benefits that these jobs bestowed.  Furthermore, while SHC employees might
have felt  lucky to retain  a job,  they  often found out that as public  servants, they  had less precise
36 See  World  Bank  (1996),  at 3.20
objectives, fewer resources at their disposal, and  lower salaries than  their colleagues retained by the
private operator. Such factors could only increase the resentment against private and particularly foreign
operators generally prevalent in the public sector, and tended to make relations between the SHC and the
private operator even more difficult.
41.  In Guinea, for example, SONEG and SEEG often disagree on  priorities concerning network
expansion.  In addition, SONEG, which is responsible for extensions to the network and for  major
rehabilitation work, is often slow in implementing investment programs. Such factors have played a role
in limiting the increase of the connection rate below forecasts. 3 '  It has also prompted SEEG, which is
formally responsible only for maintenance of all the pipes below a certain diameter, to try to develop
infrastructure directly, beyond its contractual responsibilities and this creates a further cause of tension
between the two parties. 38 While estimates of UFW varied widely during the early 1990's because of low
metering, current levels of about 50% are very high and unlikely to be lower than before the reforms.
This is due, at least in part, to coordination problems between SONEG, and SEEG. Also, as both parties
have some capacity to influence the amount of UFW, each party has been able to blame the other for the
poor performance  in that area. 39
42.  In Senegal, progress achieved with respect to access to safe drinking water and level of UFW has
remained below performance objectives established in 1995, in part because of delays in implementing
works for which SONES, the SHC, is responsible (see Figures 4 and 5, below). 40 Also, while extensive
efforts have been made to clarify the responsibilities between the parties through careful wording of the
contract as well as through the organization of meetings and seminars during which the parties worked on
resolving their differences, 41 it has proved impossible to definitively eliminate all possible sources of
disagreements in that respect.  In addition, the transfer of operational responsibilities to SDE might be
resented by some staff within SONES. As a result, tensions do persist between the private operator and
Figure  4: Actual  and Projected  Shares  of  Figure  5: Actual  and Projected  Level
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37 See Menard and Clarke (2000a), at 28.
38 The CFD, for example, extended a loan to support development of new infrastructure, whose repayment is the
responsibility of the Government, but whose implementation  is carried out directly by SEEG. Id., at 26.
39 See Brook (1996).
40  See, World Bank (2000a), at 4-5.
4L  No less than four workshops were organized shortly after the start of private operations, three of them mainly
devoted to try to solve differences in the way each party interpreted the exact scope of its contractual
responsibilities.  See Janssens (1999), at 7-8.21
the SHC.
43.  Overall, the experiences discussed above do show that some progress on the investment planning
and  financing front is possible, in  certain cases, under  PPI arrangements that  involve SHCs.  The
experience of Senegal - where SONES managed to raise a loan from commercial banks - also tends to
support the view that, at  least in some circumstances, SHCs might perform investment planning and
financing functions more effectively than ministries.  However, it is equally clear that even in the best
case scenarios,  PPI arrangements that involve the transfer of responsibilities for investment planning and
financing to SHCs present serious drawbacks. Those drawbacks stem, mainly, from an uneasy division of
responsibilities  between public and private parties, as well as from the particular characteristics of SHCs
which often tend to accentuate tensions with the private operators.
44.  Because of these problems, allocating responsibility for investment planning and financing to
SHCs is certainly not a first best option.  When private parties can accept full responsibility for meeting
all  investment obligations  (as  under  full  concessions) or  at  least  for  planning  and  implementing
investments  to be financed through cost-covering sector revenues (as attempted in C6te d'Ivoire), there is
clearly no need for entrusting a SHC with investment responsibilities. When, on the other hand, sector
revenues are clearly insufficient to cover investment costs or when regulatory uncertainty is high, there
might be no choice but to entrust ultimate responsibility for financing investments to a public entity.  In
that case, in order to avoid the problems which emerged in C6te  d'Ivoire  before 1987, it might be
advisable to also confer final decision-making power with respect to investment planning to the same
entity.  Whether this entity should be a ministry or a SHC will then depend, in each particular case, upon
whether a SHC would indeed perform its investment functions more effectively than a ministry for the
type of reasons mentioned under paragraph 36, above.
3.3. Regulating the Activities of the Private Operator
45.  As mentioned in paragraph 21, above, it is very often argued that the natural monopoly
characteristics  and social importance  of water distribution  mandate the imposition of a specific set of rules
upon operators. The broad, overall  regulatory framework  - which might include, for example, the general
rules determining the way in which private operators are to be selected as well as of the type of price
control to be imposed upon the operators - is usually determined  by political authorities. Regulatory
powers then have to be exercised to ensure the effective implementation of that broad framework. This
requires the exercise of varying degrees of discretion, depending  upon the level of specificity  of the
regulatory framework adopted by political authorities.
46.  In Cote d'Ivoire, the Water Directorate  of the Ministry of Economic Infrastructure  exercises such
regulatory powers. In Guinea, Gambia and Senegal, on the other hand, regulatory responsibilities  have
been shared  between the Government and the SHC. In the three countries, the process of implementing
the selection  process designed by political authorities to identify the private operator was conducted by
the Government itself. The SHC was, however, in each case, party to the contract concluded with the
private operator (in Guinea and Gambia the contract was signed only by the SHC and the private
operator, while in Senegal the Government  was a signatory to the contract as well). In Guinea and
Gambia, the Government retained the authority  to set consumer tariffs while the SHC was given
responsibility  for adjusting, and if necessary renegotiating,  the private operator's remuneration. In
Senegal, the SHC, in addition, proposes adjustments  to the consumer tariffs on the basis of pre-
determined  adjustment mechanisms.  In the three cases, quality standards were defined in the private
operator's contract or in separate performance agreements  and the SHC was given the task of monitoring
the operator's compliance with those standards, as well as with the other regulatory requirements. In both
Guinea and Gambia, the SHCs were given the right to impose sanctions, including termination  of the22
contract, while in Senegal, enforcement  powers remain with the Government. A summary comparison of
the allocation of regulatory functions in the three countries is presented in Table 1, below.
Table 1: Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities Between the Government and the SHC in Guinea,
Gambia and Senegal
Guinea  Gambia  Sene  Il
Gvt  SHC  Gvt  SHC  Gvt  SHC
Selecting private operator  /  V  /
Setting consumer  tariff  V  V  /
Administering consumer tariff  V  V
Setting operator's share of consumer  V  V  /
talriff
Administering operator's share of  /  V  V
consumer tariff
Setting  performance standards  V  V  V
Monitoring  private operator's  V  V  V
compliance
Imposing  penalties on private  V  V  V
operator
Source: Republique  du S6n6gal,  Ministere de l'Hydraulique (1994).
Public vs. Private Sector Options
47.  A wide body of literature has been written on the institutional requirements which should ideally
be satisfied by regulatory authorities, and a majority of commentators insist on three main inter-related
dimensions: (i) independence; (ii) legitimacy; and (iii) competency. 42 It is first argued that given the
politically  sensitive nature  of  most  infrastructure services  (and  this  is  particularly  true  of  water
distribution services), governments are often tempted to impose uneconomic tariffs and other obligations
which hamper the efficiency of infrastructure service providers and deter private operators and investors
from participating  in the provision of those services. In order to overcome that problem, regulators should
therefore be protected from undue political pressures and be as independent as possible from political
authorities.  In addition, to prevent conflicts of interest and capture by the regulated industry, regulators
should also be independent from the enterprises which they are regulating.
48.  Second, performing regulatory functions is ultimately an act of public authority and in order to
ensure  that  the  exercise  of regulatory powers is  seen as  legitimate, it  is  therefore  important that
independence be  combined with accountability with respect to both  political authorities and  users.
Requiring the regulator to publish regular reports on its activities, subjecting the regulator to budgetary
controls and ensuring that the regulator can be dismissed in well-specified cases of gross misconduct,  for
example, are all measures which can help ensure sufficient accountability vis-a-vis political authorities.
Giving interested parties opportunities to  present their views before regulatory decisions are taken,
requiring that regulatory decisions be published and reasons for them given, and ensuring the existence of
some appeal mechanisms against regulatory decisions can, for their part, contribute to make the regulator
accountable  to both users and political authorities.
49.  Third, given the technical complexity  of many regulatory issues, ensuring that the entity in charge
of those issues is able to mobilize adequate expertise is key. This supposes that sufficiently attractive
conditions be offered  to  regulatory staff to  attract fully qualified candidates and  that resources be
42 See,  for  example,  Smith  (1997  a, b, and  c).23
available to rely on outside experts to address a range of issues - such as highly technical or specialized
matters for example - which regular staff might be ill-equipped  to tackle.
50.  The independence requirement means that generally, neither a ministry nor the private operator
itself, should be entrusted with regulatory responsibilities. On the other hand, in order to satisfy the
legitimacy requirement, ultimate responsibility for regulatory decision needs, in most cases, to lie with a
public authority.  This does not mean that private experts have no role to play.  On the contrary, in order to
meet the  competency requirement and mobilize sufficient expertise to  perform technically difficult
functions, a public regulatory entity might benefit from contracting out some regulatory tasks.  In some
circumstances, whole regulatory functions may even be contracted out. Chile, for example, contracts out
the technical monitoring of water standards. 43 International arbitration,  might also be relied upon to solve
some highly technical regulatory issues.44 However, a public authority will remain necessary to take
responsibility when decisions require the exercise of substantial discretionary powers with respect to
politically sensitive issues.
Public Sector Options
51.  The PPI experiment  of Cote d'Ivoire illustrates some of the drawbacks associated with entrusting
regulatory responsibility to a  ministerial department.  While the Water Directorate is responsible for
negotiating adjustments to SODECI's remuneration and to propose changes to consumer tariffs, those
tariffs ultimately have to be approved by the Council of Ministers.  The process is therefore highly
political and, as a result, price increases have been implemented more slowly than contractually stipulated
in 1987, which led, as pointed out above, to lower than expected sector revenues.  Price increases have
also been more erratic than anticipated. The prices which were supposed to be adjusted every five years
according to contractual provisions, have in fact been renegotiated on an ad-hoc basis.  Consequently,
instead of being able to count on benefiting from greater than anticipated cost savings for five year
periods, the operator faces the risk of losing the benefit of such savings through unscheduled price
adjustments and this has arguably reduced the operator's incentives to cut costs. 45 Finally, some doubts
have been expressed about the Water Directorate's capacity to efficiently monitor SODECI's investment
activities: SODECI  might thus be able to earn excess profits on these activities, and might also give undue
priority to small investments - or lose in efficiency by dividing large investments into series of smaller
projects - in order to benefit from contractual provisions which state that all projects valued below
FCFA120 million (about US$220,000 in  1996) can be implemented by  SODECI without the need to
organize competitive tenders.46
52.  The option chosen by Guinea, Gambia, and Senegal,  of conferring regulatory responsibilities to a
SHC would seem to present, in theory, some advantages. First, regulatory decisions can be somewhat less
influenced by short-term political considerations  if they are taken by a SHC than if they are taken directly
by the Government.  As indicated above, in Guinea, Gambia, and Senegal it was expected, for example,
that SHCs would constitute a force in favor of maintaining cost-covering tariffs.  Second, SHCs are
staffed with people having an intimate knowledge of the sector, which might facilitate the execution of a
certain number of regulatory functions.  Knowledge of the cost structure of the activity might, for
example, help to determine appropriate levels of remuneration  for the operator. People with experience in
43 See Kerf  and  Smith  (1996),  at 43.
44Id.  at at 44.
4S See  Menard  and  Clarke  (2000b),  at 37.
46  Id. at 27-28.24
operating the  water distribution system might  also be in  a  good position  to  evaluate the  level of
performance  which should be expected from the operator and to monitor efficiently its activities.
53.  There are, however, good reasons to doubt that, in practice, a SHC will often be the best suited
entity to assume regulatory responsibilities. As a 100 percent State-owned entity representing the State's
ownership interests, a SHC will usually be tightly controlled by the Government. In Guinea, Gambia, and
Senegal, it was decided that Government Ministers would occupy prominent positions on the boards of
administration  of the SHCs and the SHCs appear therefore ill-equipped to resist undue political pressures.
The complex relationships which tend to develop between the SHC and the private operator are also very
likely to interfere with the performance of the SHC's regulatory responsibilities. First, there is a risk that
the regulating SHC might be captured by the private operator because the staff of the SHC, who used to
work for the public utility, are likely to keep close contacts with their ex-colleagues now working within
the private operator's  company.  Second, the SHC might well, on the other hand, be an unduly harsh
regulator: as pointed out under paragraph 40, above, staff of the SHC typically have multiple reasons to
resent the loss of their operating functions and to bear a grudge against their colleagues, working within
the private company, who are now in charge of those functions and are very likely to benefit from better
working conditions than existed before the reforms.  Third, the SHC will also be in a poor position to
exercise regulatory authority if, at the same time, it is in charge of investments or of other functions which
affect the performance of the private operator: such a situation would give rise to serious conflicts of
interests as the SHC would be both judge and judged (and other conflicts of interests might arise when the
SHC performs both ownership and regulatory functions). Fourth, since the staff of the old public utility
have gained much of their experience providing the service themselves, they will often be tempted to
micro-manage  the private operator. This latter problem will only be exacerbated if they do resent the loss
of their operational  functions.
54.  Furthermore, while public utility staff will generally have a good knowledge of the technical
aspects of service provision, they will usually have very little qualifications and experience regarding
legal, financial, and procedural matters essential for  successful regulation. In addition, sector specific
SHCs such as those created in Guinea, Gambia, and Senegal do not benefit from the potential advantages
of cross-sector regulatory agencies. These advantages might include, for example: ability to pool scarce
human resources with regulatory expertise within a single entity; greater autonomy of a cross-sector
entity both from specific sector ministries and from individual firrns; and greater ability of a cross-sector
entity to apply the  experience gained in one  sector to the regulation of other sectors (all the more
important since several regulatory issues of an economic, financial, or legal nature bear many similarities
across infrastructure sectors).
55.  The  experiences  of  Guinea,  Gambia,  and  Senegal  provide  illustrations  of  the  problems
experienced by SHCs entrusted with regulatory responsibilities. In Guinea,,  for example, SONEG's board
is under direct government control and its staff, including the Director General, is also appointed by the
Government. There is thus no protection against political interference in the regulatory process. In these
conditions, maintaining good relations with Government representatives is of the utmost importance for
the private operator, which is therefore understandably reluctant to take a tough stance against pervasive
non-payment of water bills by the public sector.  This in turn contributes to push water prices up, as large
fixed costs are passed on to those private users who actually pay their bills. 47 Another factor which
contributes to increase water prices is SONEG's lack of regulatory capacity. SONEG has proved unable
to force SEEG to comply in a timely fashion with its financial reporting requirements, and the SHC has
problems assessing whether SEEG's requests for increases of its remuneration are reasonable.  This in
turn affects consumer tariffs, which have increased faster than what was anticipated at the time of the
47 Mnard  and  Clarke  (2000a),  at 35.Figure  6: Actual  and  Projected  Tariff  25
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reforms (see figure 6 below). Water prices are now relatively  high by international  standards  and poor, or
even middle income users have problems paying their water bills.  In addition, with poor regulatory
oversight, SONEG seems to be operating under a de facto cost-plus arrangement, which transfers many
commercial risks to  the Government.  This transfer of commercial risks to the public sector might
arguably be made worse by  the fact that SONEG also appears unable to enforce a  clear separation
between SEEG's activities under the lease contract and SEEG's public work activities conducted under
separate contracts: in the absence of such clear separation, SEEG might be able to allocate any cost
overruns incurred because of its operational  activities (for which SEEG should bear some commercial
risks) to its construction  activities (for which SEEG is not supposed  to bear any commercial  risks). 48
56.  The SHC in Gambia also appears to  have been unable to  perform its monitoring functions
satisfactorily. There was continued government interference in UHC's internal affairs which prevented
proper application  of tariff provisions and water prices were in fact left unchanged during implementation
of the lease agreement.  In addition, as pointed out above, UHC staff's lack of technical capacity and
hostility toward the lease arrangement  prevented the SHC from conducting its regulatory functions in an
49 efficient  and balanced manner.
57.  In Senegal,  yearly tariff adjustments  have so far been implemented as planned, and public entities
do pay their water bills.  Various work programs, financed through a loan by International Financial
Institutions, are being implemented to harmonize  the statutes  of SONES, evaluate the capacity  of its staff,
and conduct training  programs. However,  tensions do exist between  the private operator and the SHC. As
suggested above, these tensions might be due, in part, to  unavoidable difficulties in specifying the
responsibilities  of each party, and to the resentment which some of SONES's staff might harbor toward
the transfer of operational functions to the private operator.  SDE has in  fact denounced SONES's
tendency to micro-manage  its activities. Such problems were foreseen at the design stage of the reforms
in Senegal, and various measures have been taken to try to alleviate them.  For example, not only the
SHC but also the Government is signatory  to the contract concluded with the private operator, in order to
provide comfort to  the private operator in  the face of  potential hostility by  the SHC to  the PPI
arrangement. Also, seminars were devoted to define the limits of SONES's monitoring  role and to devise
appropriate regulatory procedures. 50 While undoubtedly useful, such measures proved insufficient,
however, to put an end to the tensions and problems associated with implementation of the regulatory
framework.
48 See  Brook  (1995),  at 5.
49 See World Bank (1996), at 3.
50 See  Janssens  (1999), at 8.26
58.  Conferring overall regulatory responsibilities to  a  SHC is thus  likely to yield  unsatisfactory
results. On the other hand, entrusting the SHC with some technical tasks such as setting performance
targets for the private operator and/or monitoring the private operator's activities might at first seem to
present advantages since the personnel of the SHC is likely to  possess excellent knowledge of the
technical aspects of service provision. Allocating monitoring functions to a  SHC and other regulatory
responsibilities to other bodies could also be seen as a positive step toward ensuring proper separation
between legislative, executive, and judicial powers, thereby preventing abuses of power by regulatory
authorities. Splitting regulatory responsibilities in this way could, however, dilute regulatory authority,
create coordination  problems between different regulatory authorities, and make it more difficult for each
entity to  attract the technical expertise that it needs if  such expertise is in  short supply. Separating
responsibilities for  setting performance targets and  for determining the remuneration of the  private
operator, in particular, could seriously increase uncertainty  for the operator since the level of performance
which must be met has a strong impact on the operator's costs. In addition, the various factors mentioned
above - risks of regulatory capture, possible conflicts of interests between investment or ownership
functions and regulatory functions, possible hostility toward the  PPI  arrangement combined with a
tendency to micro-manage  the private operator, and lack of regulatory capacity - do jeopardize the ability
of the SHC to adequately perform any type of regulatory functions.  Therefore, if the advantages of
allocating  different  regulatory  responsibilities  to  different  entities  are  deemed  to  outweigh  the
disadvantages, some  private  firms,  such  as  international chartered  accountancy  companies, would
probably be better equipped than SHCs to perform some regulatory functions with competence and
iimpartiality 51
59.  The range of likely problems identified in the preceding paragraphs and the actual experience of
tie  SHCs set up  in Guinea, Gambia, and Senegal point to  the potential  superiority of autonomous,
specialized regulatory agencies to carry out regulatory functions.  Entrusting regulatory functions to a
specialized entity makes it easier to preserve the  autonomy of  that entity  with respect to  political
authorities and to avoid conflicts between ownership and regulatory functions as the regulator does not
have to represent the State's interests as the owner of sector assets.  A specialized regulatory agency,
which would not be staffed primnarily  with former employees of the old public utility, would also be much
more likely than the SHCs set up in Guinea, Gambia, and Senegal to maintain its independence and
impartiality with respect to the enterprises which it has to regulate. Regulatory agencies with staff whose
qualifications encompass not only the technical aspects of water distribution, but also a whole range of
legal, financial, and procedural skills, would be less likely to  succumb to the temptation of micro-
managing private operators and would be better equipped to perform regulatory functions competently.
The independence  of the agency with respect to both the Government and the regulated industry, as well
as the competence of the agency, could be further enhanced by setting up such an agency on a cross-
sector basis as it would limit the influence which could be exercised upon the agency by any single sector
ministry or private operator as well as increase the scope for cross-fertilization of regulatory experiences
across sectors. Specialized regulatory agencies would also be less likely to suffer from the conflicts of
interest which are bound to affect a regulatory entity, such a SHC, which also exercises non-regulatory
functions impacting upon the performance of regulated enterprises. Finally, focussing the responsibilities
of an independent regulatory agency upon regulatory matters only would arguably make  it easier to
structure the agency itself and the procedures that it would have to follow in such a way as to ensure that
the agency can be held accountable  not only to political authorities, but also to the users.
60.  Chile,  for  example,  has  established  in  1989  a  specialized  regulatory  agency  - the
Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios (SSS) - which  benefits from  at least some of the features
51 See Brook (1995), at 7.27
mentioned above: it is an autonomous decentralized  entity, whose head is appointed by the President, and
whose main functions are to grant concessions  or other private contracts for the provision of water supply
and  sewerage services, to  regulate tariffs, and  to  monitor the operators'  compliance with technical
standards. 52 Today, however, the concept of  a  specialized regulatory entity, protected  from undue
pressure from both the Government and the regulated firms, remains foreign to the political and legal
traditions of many countries (as is the case, for example, in the four African countries discussed in the
present paper).  The best solution in such circumstances is probably to take at least some steps toward
establishing an independent regulator.  Regulatory independence  from political authorities, for example,
is a relative rather than an absolute concept.  A great number of measures can be adopted to try to ensure
that independence, such as: specifying the regulator's  mandate in the law; requiring approval of the
regulator's nomination by representatives from both the executive and legislative branches; limiting the
grounds on  which regulators  can be  dismissed; ensuring that  regulatory decisions are  taken  by  a
commission rather than by a single individual and that the mandates of the different members of the
commission end at different dates so that it is less likely that they might all be replaced by the same
government; providing the regulatory entity with reliable and independent sources of funding such as
taxes levied on the regulated firms etc. Creating a regulatory agency which benefits from a few of these
measures only might not achieve the goal of full protection toward political interference  but it might still
constitute  progress compared to the alternative of conferring regulatory functions to a ministry or a SHC.
Also, if  an independent body  cannot be  entrusted with  decision-making powers, it  might  still be
worthwhile, as a first step, to establish  an independent  agency with advisory powers.
61.  When even such limited measures are unacceptable to the authorities, and when the regulator has
to be either a SHC or a ministerial department, the choice will often be difficult and results are likely to
be unsatisfactory in either case. A SHC might be exempted from civil service salary rules and might
therefore be able to offer more attractive terms of employment than a ministerial department to attract
qualified staff. It might also benefit, but often to a very limited degree only, from some protection against
political pressures.  On the other hand, the personnel of a ministerial department might have a broader
range of competencies than that of a SHC.  In addition, it might be easier, when regulatory functions are
performed by the Government, to reduce, to some extent, the risks of conflicts of interests mentioned
above: regulatory functions could, for example, be entrusted to a central ministry different from the
ministries which might retain ownership, policy, or investment responsibilities in the sector. In addition, a
central ministry might be called upon to regulate more than one infrastructure sector, thereby decreasing
the risks of regulatory capture by any single operator. It is not obvious, therefore, that a SHC will be
better  suited than a  ministry to exercise regulatory functions unless it can substantially broaden the
traditional scope of competencies of its staff, benefit from some real degree of autonomy to reduce the
risks of capture by public and private entities, and focus on regulatory functions only in order to avoid
conflicts of interest.
3.4. Promoting Acceptance of the PPI Arrangement
62.  The introduction of private participation in infrastructure sectors traditionally monopolized by
public entities is a major policy shift. It is likely to draw resistance from some quarters, particularly from
public sector staff who might be concerned about possible job losses and from segments of the population
who might fear price increases, lower quality of service, narrower scope of public service obligations, or
even economic "re-colonization"  if a foreign private company takes over the operation of the network.
63.  In Guinea, Gambia, and Senegal, it was argued that creating a  SHC would help to promote
acceptance of the reforms.  As mentioned above, establishing SHCs was seen, in all three countries, as a
52 See  Rivera  (1996),  at 62-63.28
way of maintaining jobs in the water sector for some of the public sector employees who would not
integrate the new company set up by the private operator. Creating such SHCs was also, to some degree,
a political gesture, signaling that the State intended to remain strongly involved in the sector and ensure
that the interests of the general public would be well defended.  In addition, in Senegal, the SHC was
formally entrusted with responsibility for  conducting a  public information campaign to explain the
benefits which could be expected from the reforms and, in particular, to communicate information about
the administrative  process which users have to follow to benefit from social connections. 53
Public vs. Private Sector Options
64.  The private operator undoubtedly has a  role to  play  with respect to  the  type  of functions
mentioned above. The private operator can help secure public support for its activities, for instance by
entering into agreements with unions and political authorities on the number of jobs to be maintained in
the sector, by providing training for the workers that it retains or for those who are being laid off, and by
informing the public about progress already made and plans to improve services further.  In all four
countries, the private  operator did negotiate with interested parties the  number of ex-public sector
employees whom it would hire.  In Guinea, SEEG contributed to the organization and monitoring of
training modules designed to help those workers who would not join the private company or the SHC, to
establish cooperatives specializing in public works.  In Senegal, SDE is closely monitoring the impact of
its activities on  the users by conducting consumer surveys which track the evolution of the public's
perceptions  about service quality.
65.  Whatever the private operator's role in this respect, the public authorities, as the main guarantors
of public interests, do however retain a key responsibility to help diffuse the social tensions which are
likely to emerge when overstaffing issues have to be addressed, to select the institutional formula best
adapted to assuage potential concerns about the reforms, and to inform the public about the rationale for
reforms, their expected benefits and risks, and the measures taken to mitigate such risks.
Public Sector Options
66.  The experiences of CMte  d'Ivoire,  Guinea, Gambia, and  Senegal, as  well  as those of other
countries worldwide, tend to demonstrate that establishing a SHC is neither a necessary requirement, nor
even  a  particularly effective measure, to  promote  acceptance of  PPI  reforms in  the  water  sector.
Establishing a SHC for the purpose of maintaining  jobs for workers who would not otherwise be retained
in the sector imposes costs upon all users (or upon tax payers) and is not sustainable in the long term.
While private participation may force (often overdue) layoffs by  the main service provider, it often
coincides also with broader opportunities for enterprise creation in the sector as a whole, as the private
operator contracts out a variety of tasks to increase overall efficiency. When such new opportunities are
insufficient, or for  those unable to take  advantage of  them, the establishment of  proper safety nets
combined with training programs to facilitate conversion towards other activities constitutes the only
sustainable solution. In Guinea, for example, only about half the people previously employed by DEG,
the public agency responsible for water distribution before the reforms, were retained in the  sector.
However, the measures taken to facilitate conversion of laid off workers, and particularly the training
provided to them by the private operator as mentioned above, greatly reduced workers' opposition to the
reform. 54 And in Buenos Aires, where no SHC was set up, 1600 employees accepted voluntary early
retirement on severance packages financed by the Government before the private concessionaire took
over the management of the water utility, and a further 2000 employees accepted retirement packages
53 World  Bank  (2000a),  at  9.
54  See Mdnard  and  Clarke  (2000a),  at 16.29
offered by the concessionaire itself.  As in Guinea, the utility, which was originally heavily overstaffed,
saw the number of its employees reduced by about half and a number of forner  employees are now
providing services to the company on a contractual basis.  About 8000 independent contractors are thus
estimated to work in the Buenos Aires water and sewerage sector. 55
67.  It is clear also that setting up a SHC will do very little, per se, to reassure interested parties that
public interests are well defended by the Government.  Public perceptions about the way in which the
benefits and costs of reforms are to be distributed between various parties depend upon a wide array of
factors which go well beyond the issue of whether or not a SHC has been established in the sector.  It
would be very hard to argue, for example, that just because of the existence of a SHC, people in Guinea,
Gambia, and Senegal have felt more confident about the reform process than people in CMte  d'Ivoire.  In
fact, it could be argued that in some cases, the lackluster performance  of SHCs has decreased rather than
increased  the public's confidence in the reform process.
68.  Finally, SHCs appear ill-equipped to conduct a public information campaign on the potential
benefits of the reform process.  First, staff of the SHC will generally lack the training and experience
required to  perform  such communication functions  effectively.  Second, and  perhaps  even  more
importantly, staff of the SHC are unlikely to be good advocates of the reform process since they have
reasons, as pointed out above, to resent the entry of a private operator in the sector.  The Government
itself, perhaps assisted by the independent regulator if one exists, would appear to be in a much better
position to take the lead in conducting the public information functions which are key to a successful
implementation  of the reform process.
4.  CONCLUSIONS
69.  The experiences of Guinea, Gambia, Senegal, and Cote d'Ivoire in the water sector show that
allocating responsibilities  to the type of SHCs examined in the present paper will often constitute a sub-
optimal solution as there are very few functions which SHCs appear better suited than other entities to
carry out.  The creation of a SHC might be justified to plan and finance investments, but only when that
responsibility cannot be transferred to the private operator and when tariffs are insufficient to cover
investment needs so that access, by a public entity, to other sources of finance is crucial. Even then, a
SHC might be the best equipped entity to carry out those investment functions only  if its financial
strength and accountability, or its incentives and ability to ensure that tariffs are gradually brought to
cost-covering  levels, are superior to those of a ministerial department.
70.  Sustainable development of the sector will however remain very fragile as long as cost-covering
tariffs are not implemented. Once such tariffs can be implemented, the objective should normally be to
transfer all  investment responsibilities to  the private  operator in  order to  benefit  from the  private
operator's know-how, improve coordination  between operational and investment requirements, clarify the
overall allocation of responsibilities, strengthen the private operator's accountability for overall service
performance, and give the private operator stronger incentives to ensure that cost-covering tariffs will
effectively be maintained in the long run.  If, in spite of cost-covering tariffs, the private operator remains
unwilling to assume responsibility for investment financing, it should generally be possible to entrust it
with  at  least the  investment planning and  executing functions.  Such  a  scheme  still  presents  the
advantages mentioned above except that as the private operator is not responsible for financing the
investment program,  it  will  not have  the  same incentives to  ensure  that  cost-covering tariffs  are
maintained.
55 See  Idelovitch  and  Ringskog  (1995),  at 41.30
71.  One should not forget, in addition, that once created, SHCs, like any other institutions, have a
tendency to  cling to their responsibilities (and even to try to extend them) in order to justify  their
existence.  SHCs  might  in  particular  be  tempted  to  block  future  transfers  of  investment-related
responsibilities to the private operator. It is therefore important, if SHCs are created, to take appropriate
measures (such as sunset clauses associated with adequate incentives to the managers of the SHCs) to
ensure that they do not become obstacles to transfers of additional responsibilities to the private operator
when such transfers become feasible.
72.  As  for  the  other  functions  discussed above - representing the  State's  ownership interests,
regulating the activities of the private operator, or promoting acceptance of PPI reforms - it is hard to
envision circumstances under which SHCs would be the best suited institutions to take responsibility for
carrying them out.  In addition, if investment responsibilities  are transferred to a SHC, it is likely to make
the SHC even less suitable to perform some other tasks (of a  regulatory nature for example) since
allocating those various responsibilities to a single entity would give rise to conflicts of interest issues.
73.  It is important, finally, to re-emphasize, that while the above conclusions might hold in most
circumstances, any decision regarding the potential establishment  of, and allocation of responsibilities to,
a SHC will require a careful study of the specific features of the.proposed entity and a thorough analysis
of the circumstances of the particular country and infrastructure sector concerned.31
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